Startups

Followup Answers re: Lifestyle vs. Investment and Angel vs. VC

Last night I spoke at Seattle Tech Startups. Given that lots of people who go to these meetings tend to be wantrepreneurs (aspiring startup folks), I focused on early decisions that need to be be made. Do you shoot for a great lifestyle business or do you aim for a grandslam? Services biz or product biz? Bootstrap it, find angels, or court VCs? And when you answer all that, how do you settle on an idea when you have lots of them bounding around in your head (for this part, I liberally borrowed from Ev Williams’ great post on evaluating startup ideas, which I posted a riff on a while back).

After my short presentation, there were some really fabulous questions. Two of ‘em kept me thinking and I wanted to expand on the answers a bit. Here they are.

Question (paraphrased): “Given that takinghuge piles of VC money both has the dangers you describe and and firmly closes the door on most early acquisition opportunities, why are people still going after big VC?”

My response was two-fold at the time. First, there are some ideas that require a lot of money– as an example, I mentioned a local northwest guy who is working on a really cool electric motorcycle… It’d be hard to imagine getting that business off the ground with $500k of angel money. I also mentioned that some entrepreneurs look at their valuation as a score. Taking $4m on $12m post-money is essentially saying that, on paper, your company is worth $12m. Feels pretty cool, I suppose.

Two more things to add here.

First, I think people chase VC because it’s available. Angels are purposefully elusive– they don’t exactly hang out a shingle saying, “I’ve got $50k burning a hole in my pocket”. VCs, on the other hand, have a web site, and processes to handle/process deal flow. They almost always want to lead the investment by negotiating terms and putting in a big chunk of the money, while angels sometimes shy away from leading/negotiating, but are happy to pile on with other investors.

I think there is a big hole to be filled here by institutional investors who aim at a larger number of smaller deals (something that most VCs can’t handle because they have too much money under management, take too long to do the deals, and have too few people to sit on boards). There are smaller funds out there that are starting to fill the “early/small” niche (with $250k-$1m investments) but they are rare and (from an outsider’s point of view) are buried in interesting startups to invest in. The good news is that they’re seeing great success, so more are popping up every day. If you want to see a good list of folks who are really looking at early-stage/lower-dollar deals, here’s a great article profiling a few. You’ll notice a decided lack of ‘em in the Northwest. Madrona is mentioned but I think they very rarely do a deal less than $1m.

Second, B2B. Despite Web 2.0 hype, there is tremendous money to be made with B2B software. Going the B2B route requires a sales engine or some clever distribution innovation. If you’re spinning up a sales team, that requires LOTS of money flowing out of your business (salary, commissions) before you recognize revenue for their efforts.

Question #2: “Can you talk about how to decide whether a business/idea should fall into the “lifestyle” category or the “get funding a go big” category?

My answer last night centered around overall magnitude of the idea. Could you imagine it being the next Google/Facebook/Salesforce.com? Is it that ambitious? Can you set out milestones where you end up selling for $100 million? I also mentioned that how much you NEED is important. If you can “run the experiment” for $500k to see if your market/team/idea are as good as you think, raising $10m is silly. If you can roll those same dice taking no funding and working on weekends, raising ANY money might be silly.

What I want to add: Think about how you fit into recent investment trends. Investors closely follow trends. Most seem to focus on trends and recent acquisitions that you’re already reading about– the top tier ones often try to anticipate what’s going to be the next trend. Imagine yourself pitching your idea to someone who religiously follows and tries to anticipate trends. Will their eyes light up? To my amateur eye trends that are important out there right now are: Ad networks, widgets, casual gaming, video advertising, iPhone/mobile apps, Facebook/MySpace apps, social aggregation, and (of course) anything that could credibly take a shot at killing Google. Am I missing any? There are a few tired trends that probably still have legs with some investors like niche social networks, social news sites, photosharing, etc.

If you’re outside these trends, that’s okay (we certainly are, though we think that productivity/information overload is a meme that is growing like gangbusters). It just means that you’re going to have a harder time raising money and you’ll need a bit more traction to pique VC interest. We’re just about ready to close our angel round with a fairly platinum-plated group of investors, so it’s certainly do-able. I’m just glad our founders all had hefty personal bank accounts to allow us to grow the business over the 3 months of fundraising. I know plenty of people who’ve needed 6-10 months to raise a round, so be prepared for that if you’re bucking trends.

Remember, Google came to a market that had well-funded mature players at a time when a lot of really smart people were saying that search was a dead business where you couldn’t make any money.

Another thing to consider on this front is this: Do you have some unique aspect of your business that allows you to acquire new users/customers for zero or near-zero cost? SEO, viral marketing, user-generated content are all fabulous ways to get an organic flow of visitors to your product. VCs love clever distribution wrinkles, and most successful startups have a fabulous (if sometimes accidental) story to tell here.

And finally– the best way to decide whether it’s a small biz opportunity or a huge business opportunity is to launch. If you’ve got something big, the market will start dragging you down the growth path. If it’s a big opportunity and you’re growing like gangbusters out in the wild, funding isn’t hard.

Anyhoo– hope folks enjoyed the talk– I’ll post the video if STS puts it up.

Bootstrappers Beware

A lot of people are damn religious about bootrapping businesses. Especially nowadays when it’s so easy to start a software business– you just need a few hackers, Ruby on Rails, a cheap virtual server and you’re ready to roll, right?

Sure.

But just because it’s cheaper to start a software company, doesn’t mean that it’s that much cheaper to make it from when you launch a product to the point where you’re sitting back, drinking a margarita, and marveling at the recurring revenue machine you’ve created.

The way I look at it, there are three bars that matter to me.

1) Making enough money that the business brings in enough money to pay the overhead. Rent, servers, lawyers, whatever. Hopefully you keep this really lean.
2) Making enough money that the founders get an insultingly low (but still existent) salary.
3) Making enough money that the founders can take home roughly what they’d make if they went and got a real job.

Bootstrappers are woefully bad at guessing how long it’ll take to get over these bars.

Let’s look at everyone’s favorite example of bootstrapping: 37signals (whose products and philosophies I love, by the way). According to a recent post, it took them about 6 months to build Basecamp, with DHH spending 10 hours a week (they don’t mention how much time other folks invested, but let’s assume it’s 2 other people at 10 hours a week). It turns out that with a really popular blog, a very successful consulting firm, and all of the attention that they got with Ruby on Rails, it took them about a year to get to the point where they could give up consulting and work on it full-time. I assume that they were somewhere between the 2nd and 3rd bar (mentioned above) before they made the leap, though they might’ve taken a pay cut as a leap of faith in the growth that Basecamp was experiencing. DHH sez:

“It didn’t turn into a smash hit overnight either. We ran Basecamp for a year alongside our other obligations before it was doing well enough to pay all the bills and afford our full-time attention. Most good businesses didn’t become great ones within the 12-18 months that the poster boys of the startup lottery did.”

Amen!

I’ll give you an example closer to home. RescueTime (my baby) was on TechCrunch 3 times, LifeHacker twice, and add in a few thousand other blogs (of varying flavors and colors). We are a Y Combinator company, which gives us plenty of geek cred. We’ve been [edit for clarity] mentioned in an article on the cover of the New York Times, and have gotten mentions in PC World, US News and World Report, BusinessWeek, and more. More important than that, we’ve got happy users who seem to like telling their friends (the old fashioned kind of viral marketing!). I think most SaaS startups would feel very lucky to get this kind of attention– we certainly do. But for all of this attention, I really don’t expect to clear that second bar for many many months (we’re only a month or two into having an offering that people can pay money for, so give us time!).

Let me be clear about the type of startups I’m talking about– I’m talking about low-cost (or free) product companies with price points low enough that having a human being actually SELL the damn software would be inane. Whether it’s a payout of $.83 for an ad click or $24 bucks a month for BaseCamp– having a human being wandering around selling this stuff doesn’t scale, and chances are your founding team doesn’t consist of anyone who is a motivated (and skilled) software/ad salesperson anyways.

On the other hand, if your price point is high (generally requiring a more complex or premium offering) or if you have a services component (web development consulting, managed hosting, etc)– you’re golden… Or at least you have great potential to ramp up revenue fast (as you can justify a sales effort and fairly easily convert time into money). Of course, there are the obvious downsides– for enterprise software you have to build… enterprise software (capital intensive and damn ugly). And then you should expect to spend 60-70% of your cash on sales and marketing. If you go the services-heavy route, you’re simply selling time for money… You can make a nice business out of this (I ran a consultancy for 7 years which I eventually sold out of) but there’s virtually no equity to be built– no one wants to buy a consulting business.

In my opinion, if you aren’t prepared for 18-24 months before you actually get your first paycheck (either through savings, doing it part-time / half-assed, or seed funding) you’re setting yourself up for disappointment.

Speaking Tomorrow at the Six Hour Startup Conference

Tomorrow I’m speaking on a panel at the 6 Hour Startup Conference. It should be good fun and (hopefully) informative, so if you’re spinning up a new company (or pondering it), you should come on by. Here are two things I won’t be doing at the conference:

  • Pitching my own company
  • Reading bullet items from a PowerPoint deck

Here’s a great quote from a great blog post about conferences and meetups:

“Here’s what a speaker owes an audience that travels to engage in person: more than they could get by just reading the transcript.”

I’m not a stellar public speaker (and it’s more challenging to reliably deliver value on an unstructured panel like this), so I hope we can deliver.

Value or Viral?

I can’t help but think that the startup world is a bit drunk on the concept of viral distribution. Distribution is a huge problem for startups, so I suppose that I can’t blame them.

First of all, I want to point out that I think viral distribution freakin’ rocks. It’s amazing. It’s awe-inspiring. If you can build virality into your app, do it– and do it early. What I’m focusing on in this post is when a startup is presented with a choice of “viral or value”. Either in the very earliest days when deciding what idea/problem/space to pursue (“We really love this idea, but this OTHER idea has soooo much inherent virality!”), or when making choices about features and initiatives in your startup (“THIS would make our users happy, but THIS would really bring in the new eyeballs!”). While we all like to go on about all of the hats we wear as entrepreneurs, it’s damn hard to be maniacal about making your users happy AND be investing time and energy in distribution.

So, as I watch myself continue to back-burner features at RescueTime that have viral/SEO potential, it occurs to me that it’s probably worth running through my thoughts on WHY. Thus this blog post. You can run through my thoughts with me.

“It’s easier to build a great business on top of an existing viral engine than it is to build virality into an existing business”

This was said to me by a hacker who was working with a team on a “stealth viral business”. At the time, I found myself nodding. You can’t throw a rock in Silicon Valley (or Seattle) without hitting a startup that has tried to staple on a viral loop to their application or service. “I know!” Manager X says. “Let’s add a tell-a-friend bucket to our app. And we need to widgetize it. Oh, and we should probably make a funny video about it! Then we’ll explode!” It turns out that viral loops are HARD.

But, as I think about it, I can name something that’s a LOT harder, and that’s building a product that people really want. In fact, I can fairly readily name off a long list of Facebook Apps and widget companies that have, with fairly minimal effort, built apps that are viral. I can’t as easily name off companies that have created great products that people love over a long weekend of coding. Products are HARD. Virality is, comparatively, much easier.

Another point to illustrate this– Top Facebook Apps are hemmoraging active users (some have lost 30-40% from peak). Presumably, these app creators are alarmed. I can imagine small teams huddled over a table frantically running through how they can make their apps more fun, more useful, more real. Here is an army of smart and well-financed people who are trying to add a great product onto an existing viral loop. I don’t think many of them are having a lot of success.

Virality Isn’t New

It’s important to note that virality isn’t new, especially if you argue that word-of-mouth is the same thing. For the purposes of this post, I’m talking about the type of virality that Andrew Chen (who is one of my absolute favorite bloggers) defines as:

“I tend to think of Viral Marketing that include both systematic and unsystematic ways that your current customers acquire new customers… In some of these cases, the virality has been “built-in” to the system – for example, but chain letters explicitly promise you something in return for sending on a letter, as do Multi-Level Marketing systems like Tupperware. These incentives and systematic design are originated with the intent to propagate a viral process.”

In the standard word-of-mouth model, you have:

1. User tries product.
2. User loves product.
3. User evangelizes product to everyone they know.
4. Some subset of those preached to (greater than 1) tries the product.
5. Rinse, repeat.

Think Google, Apple, Microsoft (in the early days), etc.

In the viral-focused model you have:

1. User tries the product.
2. As part of trying the product, they (sometimes unwittingly) tell everyone they know about the product.
3. Some subset of those victims tries the product.
4. Rinse, repeat.

Think Facebook Apps, chain letters, tupperware parties, Geocities, and Hotmail. Or, let’s roll back to another web investment mini-craze– the SEO/Vertical Search business. Any SEO/user-generated content business is inherently viral. User creates account. Some subset of new users create a page of content. Content gets indexed by search engines. The new page brings in some traffic. Eventually, that user-created page converts a visitors to a content creator. Rinse, repeat.

Paul Graham (“ah, yes– the obligatory PG quote”) talks about the concept of getting upwind of revenue:

“In Patrick O’Brian’s novels, his captains always try to get upwind of their opponents. If you’re upwind, you decide when and if to engage the other ship. Craigslist is effectively upwind of enormous revenues. They’d face some challenges if they wanted to make more, but not the sort you face when you’re tacking upwind, trying to force a crappy product on ambivalent users by spending ten times as much on sales as on development.”

What I THINK he’s also advocating for is the concept of getting “upwind of distribution”.

It seems to me that when you remove the “user loves the product” step, you’re failing to solve the CORE problem that needs to be solved to build a great company. If you can’t create and maintain unique value with your widget or Facebook app, you’re doomed to experience the same fate as chain letters, mood rings, and GeoCities. You might well be able to get in and get out (with millions of dollars in your pocket) before you “jump the shark“. If your startup has a user-generated-content component, you might be able to amass enough SEO-fodder to make a healthy living on advertising, but that has its own challenges.

Hopefully you’ve got some grand capital-efficient plans to get it in front of your target market (WE do– we haven’t even gotten started at this front). But if your wondering why users aren’t coming to your web site, chances are you have a product problem– not a marketing problem.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16  Scroll to top