YCombinator

Startup Postcard from Corvallis, Oregon!

Jan 26

On Friday I spoke at a “Business Bootcamp” in Corvallis, Oregon. The event was fabulous (big thanks to John Sechrest) and I was pretty impressed to see that kind of passion for startups in Corvallis.

I wanted to follow up with that community with a few thoughts (that might be interesting to a broader audience, so I’ll post it here).

Thought #1: The Valley is a Unique Animal

After the Y Combinator experience, we dove into fundraising in the Valley as well as Seattle (where we ended up settling). It didn’t take long to give focus our efforts largely on Silicon Valley. Don’t get me wrong– there are some great Seattle investors. But there just aren’t many of them, and as Paul Graham points out, investors outside of the Valley just aren’t very bold. At the Business Bootcamp, a local angel investor spoke for a bit after I did about what he looks for in a company and he seemed even less “Valley-like” than Seattle investors. The big differences that stuck out to me were:

A strong emphasis on patents/IP (in 20+ meetings with VCs and angels before we were funded, not a single one asked us for our thoughts on this).
A strong emphasis on written business plans and financial forecasting (we never were asked for anything beyond an executive summary and never were asked for any financial projections except by a single angel group in Seattle).
A desire for a big equity stake. The Corvallis angel had a an equity floor that was a third more than the premium “household name” angels in the Valley. Presumably, this is because the Corvallis angels aren’t too plentiful and have a captive audience.
A desire for a more fully formed team. He wanted a 4-7 person team before he invested.

For the record, I don’t think ANY of this is bad. I just think it’s SAFE. I imagine a methodology likes this results in far fewer failures, but also results in fewer hits and disqualifies all sorts of non-traditional teams. I think many of the startup home-runs in the last decade or two would’ve been shown the door rather quickly in Corvallis. Boldness might not be a virtue from an investor’s perspective (the landscape is littered with the financial corpses of bold early stage investors, I’m sure), but it certainly is from an entrepreneur’s perspective.

Thought #2: Audience Questions

The third presenter gave a fabulous presentation called “Do you have what it takes to be a Startup CEO?”. It was chock full of info and I certainly learned a lot. Unfortunately, there were two questions from the audience that I felt weren’t answered very well, so I’m going to take a shot at ‘em.

“I’m hearing that we need a team of 5-7 people, paying customers, provision patent applications, and mess of other things before we can even begin to ask for money. That seems inherently contradictory with the idea of angel investment.”

It does, doesn’t it? Smart angels seek to mitigate/minimize risk and most angels are pretty smart. There’s nothing more wonderful than a startup with 5-7 great team members, growing revenue numbers, a pile of great patent apps, etc. Unfortunately, angels who are looking for this kind of company are really “later stage” angel investors. Unless you, as an entrepreneur, have a million bucks to get to that point, you have two options. One, find a bolder seed-stage investor (in Corvallis or move the the Valley where bolder investors are more plentiful). Two, get some freakin’ traction. Seriously, dial back your idea to the most basic offering you can manage that people will use/buy and build it with a co-founder or two (in your off-hours if you have to). If you can launch SOMETHING that people really love (and if the TAM is big enough), investors will listen. You’ve reduced two of the main risks that they are worried about; That you are a screw-up who can’t launch a product and that what you build ends up not being particularly interesting to your target audience. The better your traction and the steeper your growth curve (in terms of usage or dollars), the easier fundraising is.

If you don’t have a gold-plated team (read: previously made an investor lots of money), a pre-existing relationship with an investor, or TRACTION, I seriously advise not trying to raise money from anyone but friends and family. Given that most entrepreneurs aren’t gold-plated (I sure as hell wasn’t) and building relationships with investors is a hard to do from scratch, your only option is launching and building traction.

“I’m a college student here. What advice would you give to an aspiring entrepreneur with a notebook full of ideas?”

The speaker quite literally responded with a long answer that amounted to, “Not everyone is CEO material. You should consider that you likely aren’t CEO material.” Really? Is that what we want to tell aspiring entrepreneurs?

The right answer (IMO) is this.

First, pick the idea that you’re going to attack. I’d say, focus on tractability with a strong bias to the ideas you are most passionate about as well as the ideas that have some built in marketing (SEO or viral– relying on word-of-mouth and salespeople is difficult and expensive).

Second, figure out what you’re good at that a startup needs. Hopefully, you can code things, design things, or sell things because the vast majority of the first months of a startup is comprised of that kind of work and precious little else.

Third, read everything here: http://ycombinator.com/lib.html

Fourth, save money or borrow a few bucks from family/friends so you can work on it full-time for 3 months. If you can’t do that, do it half-assed (it can be done!).

And finally, don’t listen to people who tell you that you might not be CEO/startup material until you’ve taken a stab at it. The world is full of unlikely CEOs from Steve Jobs to Bill Gates to Mark Zuckerberg. Roll the dice and dive in– when you’re on your deathbed, I’m betting you won’t be saying, “Gosh, I wish I could go back and take fewer risks.”

Startup Founder Evolution

Nov 15

In the past two months I’ve been on two different panels with other entrepreneurs. The first was at WTIA in Bellevue, WA (“Cashing in on Web Services“)– the other panelists were very clearly what I’d call “business entrepreneurs”. All of them had relatively successful funded startups, but not a one of them had probably written a line of code, moved a pixel, wrangled a server, or written a line of copy in months or years (some probably never had).

In contrast, the most recent panel I was on (at the O’Reilly Web 2.0 Summit) was with what I’d call “builder entprepreneurs”… All startups with great traction, some funded, but all of the founders were directly engaged with the creation of the product. They designed, coded, played sysadmin, and played all sorts of other production roles for their startups.

The contrast was startling, and it made me think hard about my earlier contention that the “business guy” doesn’t really have a useful role to play in the very earliest stages of a software startup. The first panel had a pile of examples of business guys leading startups to some significant (sometimes dramatic) success.

At one of the other panels at the Web 2.0 conference, Dave McClure (master of 500 hats and 473 font colors– and one of the smartest guys in the game) summed up the life-cycle of a startup in a great way. “There’s the product development phase, the market development phase, and the revenue development– or revenue optimization– phase.” Rings true to me.

So with this in mind, let’s track the value of a “product entrepreneur” over the early life of a company:

Now let’s track the value of a “business entrepreneur” over the early life of a company:

(note: I’m talking about one person’s ability to make a major impact with a startup– I’m not saying that either person is useless at any stage of the startup… And, of course, exceptions abound)

As I’ve said before, the business guy often doesn’t have a lot to do in the early stage of product development– especially if the builders are building something that they actually want themselves. If you’re a bunch of hackers building a simple photo sharing, you don’t need a business guy telling you what the market wants. Of course, if you’re a bunch of hackers building business time management software, you might well need that. Your mileage may vary.

But what I haven’t said before (and what I’m coming to learn) is that the product entrepreneurs have an increasingly marginal role as a startup evolves and becomes more successful. In fact, I’d argue that they are in a rude awakening– they either need to evolve into business entrepreneurs (as Gates and Jobs did, for example– both shrewd business guys) or hire people to play that role (a la Eric Schmidt at Google). Building an asset is the first (and most important) challenge. But finding the customer for that asset and maximizing the revenue/profit is also a challenge (and one that many builders are ill-suited to handle).

It feels like product entrepreneurs are oftentimes “cowboys”. Flying by the seat of their pants, they rally a small team to build a product that people want. It’s no surprise that this is really freakin’ hard and requires a mythical combination of brute force time and effort, insight, customer empathy, and a huge pile of luck. Saddling the product team with a biz guy who chases big customers and locks in the product direction too early can be deadly, as the Wizard points out:

This is one reason I hate to see very early stage companies sign a big customer before the product is baked. You are encumbered by product commitments and customer support before you truly know what the market wanted. You have to be passionate about a customer and the product when you should be laser focused on the product. The customer’s needs and your goals vis a vis the market may diverge. In an effort to show progress, however, the marquee customer is attractive in the belief it will help attract investment (and this may indeed be true). In a previous life before FeedBurner, my founders and I made the mistake of signing a big name customer to a paid monthly contract before we really knew what the product’s place in the market should be. Won’t ever do that again.

The product development phase of company needs product development people and precious little else.

But as the market development phase sets in, builder entrepreneurs are oftentimes increasingly obsolete. It’s no longer time to hurl features willy nilly at your users– you’ve already built something that they like. No you need to measure the hell out of it and turn it into something that they love. You need to iterate on it and turn it into something that confuses 4% of your new users instead of 7%. It means finding a way to tune your viral loop and conquer your SEO enemies to increase the organic flow to your product. And you need to start expoloring the market to figure out who they hell is going to pay for all of this. That means crafted adwords campaigns. That means cold calling. That means price experimentation. That means exploring the world of direct ad sales. Well, it can mean all sorts of things, depending on whether you are a free web service, a freemium product, a pure b2b play or some combination thereof.

But you are firmly out of the world of building products and drifting into the world of iterating a product and exploring a market. And, likely, you’re in the world of sales, marketing, and instrumenting the hell out of your app/site.

As Papa PG says, if you look at the leaders of successful tech companies you see more CS degrees than you see MBAs. That makes sense– geeks are critical to conquer the first (and most important) problem of a startup… Building a badass product. But if you look at these same tech companies, you see CS geeks who’ve actually set aside their geeky roots (though maybe not their geeky instincts) and become very very shrewd business guys. And you also see inferior products kicking the crap out of superior products through better sales/marketing/and distribution.

So to all of you builders out there… Beware! When you reach a challenge in the evolution of your business, the most natural thing in the world is to frame it as a product problem. “If we just build this new feature/product, we’ll be off to the races and we’ll never have to do any of that business crap!”. Keep your eyes peeled for the time when you have to personally evolve and start tackling business problems, or step out of the way and let someone else do it for you.

Followup Answers re: Lifestyle vs. Investment and Angel vs. VC

Jul 10

Last night I spoke at Seattle Tech Startups. Given that lots of people who go to these meetings tend to be wantrepreneurs (aspiring startup folks), I focused on early decisions that need to be be made. Do you shoot for a great lifestyle business or do you aim for a grandslam? Services biz or product biz? Bootstrap it, find angels, or court VCs? And when you answer all that, how do you settle on an idea when you have lots of them bounding around in your head (for this part, I liberally borrowed from Ev Williams’ great post on evaluating startup ideas, which I posted a riff on a while back).

After my short presentation, there were some really fabulous questions. Two of ‘em kept me thinking and I wanted to expand on the answers a bit. Here they are.

Question (paraphrased): “Given that takinghuge piles of VC money both has the dangers you describe and and firmly closes the door on most early acquisition opportunities, why are people still going after big VC?”

My response was two-fold at the time. First, there are some ideas that require a lot of money– as an example, I mentioned a local northwest guy who is working on a really cool electric motorcycle… It’d be hard to imagine getting that business off the ground with $500k of angel money. I also mentioned that some entrepreneurs look at their valuation as a score. Taking $4m on $12m post-money is essentially saying that, on paper, your company is worth $12m. Feels pretty cool, I suppose.

Two more things to add here.

First, I think people chase VC because it’s available. Angels are purposefully elusive– they don’t exactly hang out a shingle saying, “I’ve got $50k burning a hole in my pocket”. VCs, on the other hand, have a web site, and processes to handle/process deal flow. They almost always want to lead the investment by negotiating terms and putting in a big chunk of the money, while angels sometimes shy away from leading/negotiating, but are happy to pile on with other investors.

I think there is a big hole to be filled here by institutional investors who aim at a larger number of smaller deals (something that most VCs can’t handle because they have too much money under management, take too long to do the deals, and have too few people to sit on boards). There are smaller funds out there that are starting to fill the “early/small” niche (with $250k-$1m investments) but they are rare and (from an outsider’s point of view) are buried in interesting startups to invest in. The good news is that they’re seeing great success, so more are popping up every day. If you want to see a good list of folks who are really looking at early-stage/lower-dollar deals, here’s a great article profiling a few. You’ll notice a decided lack of ‘em in the Northwest. Madrona is mentioned but I think they very rarely do a deal less than $1m.

Second, B2B. Despite Web 2.0 hype, there is tremendous money to be made with B2B software. Going the B2B route requires a sales engine or some clever distribution innovation. If you’re spinning up a sales team, that requires LOTS of money flowing out of your business (salary, commissions) before you recognize revenue for their efforts.

Question #2: “Can you talk about how to decide whether a business/idea should fall into the “lifestyle” category or the “get funding a go big” category?

My answer last night centered around overall magnitude of the idea. Could you imagine it being the next Google/Facebook/Salesforce.com? Is it that ambitious? Can you set out milestones where you end up selling for $100 million? I also mentioned that how much you NEED is important. If you can “run the experiment” for $500k to see if your market/team/idea are as good as you think, raising $10m is silly. If you can roll those same dice taking no funding and working on weekends, raising ANY money might be silly.

What I want to add: Think about how you fit into recent investment trends. Investors closely follow trends. Most seem to focus on trends and recent acquisitions that you’re already reading about– the top tier ones often try to anticipate what’s going to be the next trend. Imagine yourself pitching your idea to someone who religiously follows and tries to anticipate trends. Will their eyes light up? To my amateur eye trends that are important out there right now are: Ad networks, widgets, casual gaming, video advertising, iPhone/mobile apps, Facebook/MySpace apps, social aggregation, and (of course) anything that could credibly take a shot at killing Google. Am I missing any? There are a few tired trends that probably still have legs with some investors like niche social networks, social news sites, photosharing, etc.

If you’re outside these trends, that’s okay (we certainly are, though we think that productivity/information overload is a meme that is growing like gangbusters). It just means that you’re going to have a harder time raising money and you’ll need a bit more traction to pique VC interest. We’re just about ready to close our angel round with a fairly platinum-plated group of investors, so it’s certainly do-able. I’m just glad our founders all had hefty personal bank accounts to allow us to grow the business over the 3 months of fundraising. I know plenty of people who’ve needed 6-10 months to raise a round, so be prepared for that if you’re bucking trends.

Remember, Google came to a market that had well-funded mature players at a time when a lot of really smart people were saying that search was a dead business where you couldn’t make any money.

Another thing to consider on this front is this: Do you have some unique aspect of your business that allows you to acquire new users/customers for zero or near-zero cost? SEO, viral marketing, user-generated content are all fabulous ways to get an organic flow of visitors to your product. VCs love clever distribution wrinkles, and most successful startups have a fabulous (if sometimes accidental) story to tell here.

And finally– the best way to decide whether it’s a small biz opportunity or a huge business opportunity is to launch. If you’ve got something big, the market will start dragging you down the growth path. If it’s a big opportunity and you’re growing like gangbusters out in the wild, funding isn’t hard.

Anyhoo– hope folks enjoyed the talk– I’ll post the video if STS puts it up.

PR: Pitching TechCrunch, Scoble, and other Influentials

Jul 04

Christian Anderson (a former colleague at Jobster) had an interesting (and well-researched) post on his blog called “How to Pitch Robert Scoble — HINT: No Direct Tweets“… , which led to a discussion on FriendFeed (with Robert himself weighing in) that was pretty interesting.

I had a contribution bouncing around in my head but held off responding until I read an absolutely fabulous quote from one of my favorite books on marketing:

““No one ever got anywhere by lavishing calls on Oprah. The only time I’ve succeeded in my career with Oprah was [when] Oprah called us.”

— Barry Krause, in Made to Stick

This advice can be generalized to getting PR, blog coverage, angel and VC interest, and more… And can be summed up in one tight little phrase: “Be worth talking about.”

So how do you get to be worth talking about? Redirect every bit of outgoing energy you’re spending on getting noticed to being worthy of notice. Near as I can tell, this isn’t just a matter of building something great… It seems to be some arcane combination of:

Building something people want.
Find a parade that’s forming and start walking in front of it. We’ve (by pure luck) done well from PR perspective by diving headfirst into the “information overload” meme that seems to have growing interest and press coverage. Whether you’re building a comfortable lifestyle business or shooting for the moon, it’s great thing to be topical. A great contempory example of this is FriendFeed– they’ve (perhaps accidentally) inserted themselves into the Twitter conversation. If Twitter had never existed, would FriendFeed have gotten a tenth of the organic PR?
Figure out the best way to deliver your message– find a way to make it sticky (“Made to Stick” espouses being simple, unexpected, concrete, credible, emotional, a story). Entrepreneurs (especially if they are web geeks) notoriously marginalize this step, but there’s all sorts of great stories about simple messaging shifts making a huge difference. I don’t think we’ve nailed the perfect message for RescueTime, but I’m in a fairly constant state of brainstorming and experimentation… I’ll tell our story with a new permutation just about every day to see if I can find something that resonates just a little better (this is one of the many reasons that “stealth” companies are so often ridiculous).
For God’s sake, get some freakin’ traction. Bloggers and reporters are in the business of reporting on the metaphorical parades that I just talked about. The best way to prove that you’re at the front of a parade is to have an army of enthusiastic users who are already using assorted channels (word of mouth, blogs, twitter, etc) to tell the world how important you are to THEM. It doesn’t take MUCH traction– two or three vocal users is often enough to convince a blogger than you’re worth a second look.

I’ll finish with a great quote from Seth Godin on “grand openings“:

“The best time to promote something is after it has raving fans, after you’ve discovered that it works, after it has a groundswell of support, [ed: and after you've figured out how to effectively talk about it]. And more important, the best way to promote something is consistently and persistently and for a long time. Save the bunting for Flag Day.”

Bootstrappers Beware

Jun 19

A lot of people are damn religious about bootrapping businesses. Especially nowadays when it’s so easy to start a software business– you just need a few hackers, Ruby on Rails, a cheap virtual server and you’re ready to roll, right?

Sure.

But just because it’s cheaper to start a software company, doesn’t mean that it’s that much cheaper to make it from when you launch a product to the point where you’re sitting back, drinking a margarita, and marveling at the recurring revenue machine you’ve created.

The way I look at it, there are three bars that matter to me.

1) Making enough money that the business brings in enough money to pay the overhead. Rent, servers, lawyers, whatever. Hopefully you keep this really lean.
2) Making enough money that the founders get an insultingly low (but still existent) salary.
3) Making enough money that the founders can take home roughly what they’d make if they went and got a real job.

Bootstrappers are woefully bad at guessing how long it’ll take to get over these bars.

Let’s look at everyone’s favorite example of bootstrapping: 37signals (whose products and philosophies I love, by the way). According to a recent post, it took them about 6 months to build Basecamp, with DHH spending 10 hours a week (they don’t mention how much time other folks invested, but let’s assume it’s 2 other people at 10 hours a week). It turns out that with a really popular blog, a very successful consulting firm, and all of the attention that they got with Ruby on Rails, it took them about a year to get to the point where they could give up consulting and work on it full-time. I assume that they were somewhere between the 2nd and 3rd bar (mentioned above) before they made the leap, though they might’ve taken a pay cut as a leap of faith in the growth that Basecamp was experiencing. DHH sez:

“It didn’t turn into a smash hit overnight either. We ran Basecamp for a year alongside our other obligations before it was doing well enough to pay all the bills and afford our full-time attention. Most good businesses didn’t become great ones within the 12-18 months that the poster boys of the startup lottery did.”

Amen!

I’ll give you an example closer to home. RescueTime (my baby) was on TechCrunch 3 times, LifeHacker twice, and add in a few thousand other blogs (of varying flavors and colors). We are a Y Combinator company, which gives us plenty of geek cred. We’ve been [edit for clarity] mentioned in an article on the cover of the New York Times, and have gotten mentions in PC World, US News and World Report, BusinessWeek, and more. More important than that, we’ve got happy users who seem to like telling their friends (the old fashioned kind of viral marketing!). I think most SaaS startups would feel very lucky to get this kind of attention– we certainly do. But for all of this attention, I really don’t expect to clear that second bar for many many months (we’re only a month or two into having an offering that people can pay money for, so give us time!).

Let me be clear about the type of startups I’m talking about– I’m talking about low-cost (or free) product companies with price points low enough that having a human being actually SELL the damn software would be inane. Whether it’s a payout of $.83 for an ad click or $24 bucks a month for BaseCamp– having a human being wandering around selling this stuff doesn’t scale, and chances are your founding team doesn’t consist of anyone who is a motivated (and skilled) software/ad salesperson anyways.

On the other hand, if your price point is high (generally requiring a more complex or premium offering) or if you have a services component (web development consulting, managed hosting, etc)– you’re golden… Or at least you have great potential to ramp up revenue fast (as you can justify a sales effort and fairly easily convert time into money). Of course, there are the obvious downsides– for enterprise software you have to build… enterprise software (capital intensive and damn ugly). And then you should expect to spend 60-70% of your cash on sales and marketing. If you go the services-heavy route, you’re simply selling time for money… You can make a nice business out of this (I ran a consultancy for 7 years which I eventually sold out of) but there’s virtually no equity to be built– no one wants to buy a consulting business.

In my opinion, if you aren’t prepared for 18-24 months before you actually get your first paycheck (either through savings, doing it part-time / half-assed, or seed funding) you’re setting yourself up for disappointment.